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Mendoza and Mason draw attention to dif- 
ferences in the physiolo and temperament 
social structure. Socha reviews blood group 
serology in non-human primates, including 
investi atory techniques. Rumpler ’ves his 
based on analyses of their karyot pes. Smith 
rimarily with 
apers these elements are 
views of evolution and 
make statements about behavior as well. 
The broad integration of anatomy, physiol- 
ogy, and behavior attem ted in various de- 
view of the particular adaptations of each 
primate species. This volume provides an 
opportunit to  refresh one’s view of the 
Volume 3 has 15 papers and ranges from 
socialization, sex, and social behavior to 
studies of vocalization and, finally, conser- 
vation and captive breeding of primates. 
Some of the papers are fairly extensive 
reviews. These include Poirier on primate 
of primate species and t r eir relation to their 
view o f the monophyletic origin o ? lemurs 
et al. give a re ort of their wor l on rhesus 
macaque trans P errins and albumins. 
morphology, an 2 taxonomy, but 
grees here makes possib P e a more complete 
progress o P primate evolutionary studies. 
Volume 2 is concerned 
socialization, Feistner and McGrew on food- 
sharing, Nadler and Dahl’s “Sexual Behav- 
iour of the Great Apes,” Tattersall and Suss- 
man’s “Ecology and Behaviour of the 
Malagasy Primates,” Poirier and Kanner’s 
review of Asian colobine society, and Mitter- 
meier on primate conservation. Others are 
more specific in their to ic: Chivers’ “Social 
rhesus monkey behavior, Coelho and Bram- 
blett on behavior of baboons. 
As with volume 2, there is an attempt to 
give the historical background in many of the 
papers and lead up to the present status of 
the topic covered. Volume 2 is the better 
integrated, having fewer papers and a better 
relation between their topics. Volume 3 does 
have the integrating theme of ethology, but 
the offerings are narrower in focus and 
rather less interrelated. Both volumes could 
benefit by an added cha ter which inte- 
tors. 
Behavior of the Lesser 1 pes,” Seth et al. on 
grates the efforts of the in B ividual contribu- 
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SCIENCE AND RELATIVISM: OME KEY CONTROVER- 
SIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. By L. 
Laudan. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 1990. xiii + 180 pp. $12.95 (paper). 
We are accustomed to regard the stud of 
tual enterprise exemplified by the denizens 
in the Grove of Academe in ancient Greece 
and by scholarly rofessors at subsequent 
ambivalence in our attitude towards the 
term, however, and although we think of 
philosophy as being the height of intellectual 
activity on the one hand, on the other we 
tend to regard it as relatively divorced from 
the things that really matter. The argument 
about how many angels can dance on the 
head of a pin is repeatedly cited as a demon- 
stration of just how inane philosophical dis- 
putation can become even though the Medi- 
eval concern about whether angels were 
cor oreal entities or not was never phrased 
in &at fashion. So we tend to treat philoso- 
philosophy as a kind af high-minded intel 9 ec- 
institutions of hig R er learning. There is an 
phers with a mixture of uncomprehending 
admiration and unwarranted scorn. 
Occasionally philosophy will have an im- 
pact on science as, for example, has been the 
case with “The New Archaeolo ” where the 
influence of Sir Karl Popper le r to the devel- 
opment of a fearsome hypothetico-deductive 
jargon and a deni ation of induction to the 
halt. Most practitioners of science, however, 
plug alon with relatively little attention 
the are about. 
d e r  now and then, however, we get con- 
frontezwith philoso hically based questions 
focus on what hilosophers are actually sa - 
More recently, we have been mentionel 
been confronted with what seems on the face 
of it to be an even more irrational position. 
One school of philosophers has emerged 
which claims that the realm of scientific 
endeavor has not succeeded in producing any 
extent that basic F ieldwork almost came to a 
given to t a e philosophical niceties of what 
from students or co K eagues that force us to 
B ing. Some of f o per’s effects have alrea y 
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accumulation of our comprehension of the 
world over the past the past several centu- 
ries. These ,philosophers go by the name of 
“relativists, although no two are exact1 
a claim as a atent absurdity, but it has been 
not sufficiently skilled in formal philosophi- 
cal argumentation to be able to frame a 
definitive rebuttal. 
Larry Laudan, in his racefully written 
to our rescue. Since the time of Plato, philos- 
ophers have favored the format of a dialogue 
to  present their ideas, and Laudan has bor- 
rowed and expanded upon this to present his 
treatment of the problems facin relativism 
three-day period by four fictive members of 
the American Philosophical Congress. 
These four figures represent the major 
philosophical positions currently identifi- 
able: realism, positivism, pragmatism and, 
of course, relativism. Each is a clever amal- 
gam of real functioning hilosophers past or 
trayed as Quincy Rortabender, a combina- 
tion of Willard Van Orman Quine, Richard 
Rorty, and Paul K. Feyerabend, and includes 
aspects of Thomas S. Kuhn. Laudan recog- 
nizes that neither Kuhn nor Quine accept 
the relativist label, but he maintains that 
their writings have unmistakable implica- 
tions for the relativist position. Quinc in 
goes” stance of Feyerabend, and, although he 
does defend the relativist manifesto that 
“The way we take things to be is quite inde- 
pendent of the way things are,” he remains 
quite gracious during the course of the de- 
bate even though the other three rather gang 
up on him. 
The realist is Karl Selnam, evidently a 
combination of Popper, Roy Wood Sellars, 
and Hilary Putnam. He has less to say than 
the others in the debate, and the character is 
less well drawn. This may be because it is 
hard to see a fully developed realism in 
Popper’s writings. The positivist is Rudy 
Reichfeigl, a combination of Rudolf Carnap, 
Hans Reichenbach, and Herbert Feigl. Fi- 
nally, the pragmatist is Percy Lauwey, a 
alike. Obviously most scientists regard suc i 
offered in a1 Y seriousness and most of us are 
little book Science and Re f atiuism, has come 
in the form of a conversation a eld over a 
present. For example, t K e relativist is por- 
fact is far less of a nihilist than the “anyt i ing 
mixture of Charles Sanders Peirce and John 
Dewey with major doses of Larry Laudan 
himself. 
Although Laudan defends the view that 
the relativist osition is “profoundly wrong- 
headed,” he c f  oes not present it in the ex- 
treme forms that invite ridicule and scorn 
since, as he notes in his introduction, he is 
“not interested in cheap victories.” In the 
three days of debate recorded, the antago- 
nists deal with all of the issues in a most 
civilized manner and with a minimum of the 
rarefied jar on that often keeps non-philos- 
grapple with the core writings of the various 
schools of thought. 
Most scientists tend to  assume ke aspects 
ophers in t a e dark when they attempt to 
pragmatism, and rea P ism, and 
comfortable with the position 
If one really wants to 
see how these various views differ, there is 
no better book to consult. However, since it is 
written in conversational form, that means 
one has to plow through a lot of discussion to 
get the various points. The conversations 
are arran ed by subject starting with the 
matter o f  “Pro ress and Cumulativity” 
mination,” “Holism,” “Standards of Success,” 
“Incommensurability,” and “Interests and 
the Social Determinants of Belief.” 
For most of us, erhaps the nicest thing 
been written. It is comforting to be able to 
cite the writings of a first-rate professional 
philosopher as a defense a ainst the attacks 
tism is rooted in the traditions that ema- 
nated from the Scottish School of “Common 
Sense” in the eighteenth century, and so too 
is the Darwinian biology that underlies our 
own field. The two are happily compatible, 
and it is nice that we can continue to pursue 
our chosen research gambits secure in the 
knowledge that full hilosophical justifica- 
stature of Larry Laudan. 
through “Theory- P adenness and Underdeter- 
about his book is t K e knowledge that it has 
of the extreme relativists. E audan’s pragma- 
tion has been provi CQ ed by a scholar of the 
C. LORING BRACE 
Museum of Anthropology 
University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 
